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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the extent to which characteristics of local union
affiliates, employers, and product markets influence centralization of
authority over collective bargaining in national unions in the United States.
We hypothesize three strategies for unions to follow and delineate the
empirical implications of each. Our results suggest that the proportion of
the union workers in its jurisdiction organized by the union, the degree of
unionization in the industries, the degree of heterogeneity of industries that
the union organizes, and the size of local affiliates each influence the
centralization of collective bargaining decisions. Implications of a model of
the national union as an information provider are most strongly supported.
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Environmental Determinants of Centralization of
the Collective Bargaining Function in American Unions
There is a small but growing literature that suggests that the internal
characteristics of unions influence a wide variety of industrial relations and
labor market outcomes (e.g., Roomkin, 1976; Fiorito and Hendricks, 1987;
Maranto and Fiorito, 1987; Delaney, Fiorito, and Masters, 1988). In this
paper we examine the causes of variation in the internal governance structures
of U.S. national unions. In particular, we seek to explain a key aspect of
the vertical plane of union structure: the locus of control within the
hierarchy of a national union over collective bargaining by affiliated
bargaining units. Although there is a long history of similar investigations
of the internal hierarchical structure of firms (e.g., Caves 1980; Williamson
1985), the literature on union structure is sparse.
Our analysis proceeds from the assumption that the primary objective of
unions is to improve the terms and conditions of employment for their members.
This is analogous to the assumption that the primary motivation for the
formation of the firm is to maximize profits for the owners , which may be
accomplished by minimizing the sum of the transaction costs and production
costs associated with achieving these profits.
In the United States, collective bargaining has historically been the
primary "method" of accomplishing that goal. 1 Collective bargaining refers to
the negotiation of an agreement with the employer governing the terms and
1Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1911) describe three methods by which workers might
improve their lives through collective action: mutual insurance, collective
bargaining, and legislative enactment. Fiorito, Gramm and Hendricks
(forthcoming) have recently suggested expanding that list to include
monitoring and shaping public opinion. They point out that unions often
pursue multiple methods because they are complementary. There may be more
centralization of control over some methods than others. We focus solely on
the locus of control over collective bargaining.
conditions of employment. The formal structure of collective bargaining in
the U.S. is decentralized. Although there are notable exceptions, the
bargaining unit usually comprises employees of a single firm, and often is not
even firm-wide. In most instances, it is the local union or a group of local
unions who are signatories to the collective bargaining agreement that they
negotiate with the employer. However, the national union, which is a
federation of local unions, may have policies and rules that exert more or
less control over the bargaining process and the content of collective
bargaining agreements negotiated by member locals. 2
Kochan and Katz (1988: 123-131) emphasize that the choice of strategies
to achieve union goals, the bargaining structure with which the union must
deal and the organizational structure of the union interrelate. The same
theme underlies much of the literature on the structure of firms (e.g.
,
Chandler 1962, 1977), which emphasizes the interrelationships of business
strategy, market structure and firm internal structure. The key point is that
strategy, bargaining structure, and organizational structure are potentially
choice variables for the union; therefore, the determinants of one will be
interlinked with the determinants of the others. In the next section we
investigate several alternative strategies for the union and the implications
of each for organizational structure.
I. The Implications of Union Bargaining Strategies for Centralization
As Bok and Dunlop (1970: 108) note "In theory at least, the union will
maximize the welfare of its members by decentralizing its bargaining in order
to give as much autonomy to particular groups as it can without jeopardizing
2Kochan (1980:192-200) notes that decision-making authority on labor relations
matters is more centralized within U.S. corporations than formal bargaining
structure would suggest. He characterizes managerial decision-making as
highly centralized in regard to key strategic decisions. See especially page
200.
the interests of the larger body of members." Ulman (1955: 213) indicates
that a distinguishing aspect of U.S. national unions was the persistence of a
spirit of local separatism and autonomy. Thus, we take as a starting point
that U.S. unions would prefer to achieve their goals through decentralized
units that maximize the community of interest in bargaining outcomes among
employees. 3 However, decentralization may be a highly inefficient method of
achieving certain goals. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the influence
of particular strategies on the resulting union structure and the locus of
control within that structure.
Although unions may choose from a variety of bargaining strategies to
accomplish their objective of improving employment conditions for their
members, those strategies can be categories under three general headings: (1)
a monopoly strategy, (2) an efficiency strategy, and (3) a monitoring
strategy. In reality, these strategies are not always mutually exclusive.
"To the contrary, we should expect unions to pursue members' interests in all
possible forms" (Hirsch and Addison, 1986: 21). However, the characteristics
of the national union's local affiliates and the environment in which they
bargain will influence the relative success of, and therefore the relative
reliance upon, each of the three strategies. As a result, unions may vary in
the extent to which they emphasize one strategy over another. Moreover,
centralization of control over collective bargaining is more compatible with
some strategies than with others.
We can think of each strategy as reflecting an underlying view or model
of how unions improve employment conditions for their members. And each of
these "models" generates some testable hypotheses linking observable variables
3Problems with aggregation of preferences and imperfect agents (Faith and
Reid, 1987; North, 1988) also argue for decentralization of decision making
to the degree of centralization of bargaining within a national union. We now
define each strategy/model and the implications of a national union's reliance
on each strategy for the optimal locus of control over collective bargaining.
The Monopoly- Strategy Model
There are two methods of increasing the compensation of union members
through monopolization of the labor market. The first is to control the
supply of labor by forming a craft union. The second is to use the threat of
imposing strike costs to force the employer to acquiesce to wage demands
(i.e., form an industrial union).
The union must be able to eliminate labor cost competition among many if
not all the firms in the industry if it is going to be successful in
redistributing economic profits to its members. There are two necessary
conditions for taking labor costs out of competition. The union must first
eliminate nonunion competition by organizing all the relevant producers in the
product market,'' which gives it monopoly control over the supply of labor. It
must then eliminate labor cost competition among the unionized producers in
the market by standardizing the terms of employment, thereby mimicking a
monopolistic seller of labor.
Thus, effective pursuit of the monopoly strategy requires eliminating
competition from other unionized workers and nonunion workers. The potential
for competition among unionized workers is not trivial. Historically, such
competition commonly resulted when several unions attempted to organize the
same occupation in the same area. This was the primary motivation for the
emergence of the doctrine of "exclusive jurisdiction" begun under the old
A For example, in a competitive industry in which there was no pre -union
variation in production costs among firms, it would be necessary to impose
standard rates on all producers in the industry. In contrast, in industries
characterized by variation in production costs, the union would only need to
enforce a standard rate among the low cost producers.
American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.). Under this doctrine only one national
union had jurisdiction over the organization of workers in a specific craft.
The rise of mass production using semi-skilled workers and the passage of the
Wagner Act contributed to the evolution of this early doctrine to encompass a
notion of exclusive representation based on industry or craft. The emergence
of industry-based unions resulted in a substantial increase in interunion
organizing rivalries, and the resolution of such jurisdictional disputes
between unions was a major stumbling block to the merger of the A.F.L. and the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.). The resolution of these
interunion disputes is now an important function of the A.F.L.- C.I.O., which
is the merged federation of national unions . ^
Competition among union workers can occur even when a single national
union organizes all workers in the relevant product market. Specifically,
unionized workers at one firm might settle for lower wages than those at a
second competing firm, thereby putting the second firm at a competitive
disadvantage. In other words, if one group of unionized workers accepts terms
that are below the standard rate, the eventual result is downward pressure on
terms and conditions throughout the industry.
Intraunion competition can occur even between different plants in the
same firm. The firm might offer a low wage to workers in one local union and
threaten to move work to a plant represented by a second local if the first
local rejects the offer. It can make the same offer to the second local. The
union can only solve this bargaining problem -- the "prisoners' dilemma" 5 --
by the centralization of bargaining decisions through either of two non-
exclusive methods. Both can be viewed as formalized substitutes for "organic"
solidarity. First, bargaining units can be established that incorporate all
workers who might be "whipsawed" by employer demands. 6 Second, even if the
parties preserve separate bargaining units, the national union can accomplish
the same end by locating control over negotiated terms and conditions of
employment at a level that reduces firms' opportunities to whipsaw local
unions
.
Where product markets are local in scope, local organization may be
sufficient to bring about the conditions necessary to allow a monopoly
strategy. However, when product markets extend beyond the jurisdictional
boundaries of local unions some mechanism for centralizing control over the
terms of employment negotiated by competing locals is necessary for
enforcement of the standard rate policy and, as a result, for the success of a
monopoly strategy.
The formation of national organizations by local craft unions was a
response to such pressures for centralization. Early craft unions organized
around the territory corresponding to the scope of the local product market
5Suppose two prisoners are isolated in two rooms and they are each told that
they will receive lighter sentences if they confess before the other. Suppose
also that the police could not convict either prisoner without the testimony
of the other. If the prisoners cannot coordinate their actions to eliminate
incentives to "cheat," then both will be convicted. Obviously, criminals
place a strong emphasis on not "squealing." In support of the applicability of
this analogy, note that the term "fink" has a similar meaning for both
criminals and union members, i.e., one who welches on terms designed for the
collective good for the sake of individual advantage.
6Cappelli(1987a) argues that wages outcomes are very sensitive to market
conditions when the negotiating structure is decentralized but that these
outcomes are insensitive to market conditions when bargaining is industry-
wide. He finds empirical support for these notions when they are applied to
data from the British coal industry.
and around occupations. Ulman's (1955) analysis suggests that the expansion
of markets was a primary reason for the formation of national craft unions
.
As the area of competition grew, the local craft unions had to consider how to
extend their control over the supply of labor throughout the expanding market.
A national organization offered several distinct advantages in this regard.
First, it provided potential economies of scale in organizational attempts --
full-time national organizers might be more efficient. 7 Second, a national
organization made it possible to control entry into the craft and had the
power to blacklist strike-breakers (Faith and Reid, 1987) and rate-breakers.
Finally, a national union had the capacity to coordinate wage demands and
strike activities; which helped standardization of wage rates. Thus, local
craft unions had strong incentives to federate horizontally as markets
expanded geographically, and
...to surrender some elements of autonomy. The degree of
sacrifice required varied considerably from union to union, but
some curtailment of local discretion was incurred in the following
spheres of activity: the initiation of work stoppages, the
determinations of initiation fees, and control over jobs. (Ulman,
1955: 610)
In short, national organizations became necessary to maintain local craft
unions' monopoly power in the face of expanding markets. Thus, the threat of
competition from nonunion producers and among unionized craft workers in
different locales created incentives for the formation of national labor
organizations, and for some centralization of control over the organizing and
bargaining functions of those organizations.
7Recent calls for greater use of volunteer rank and file members in organizing
(e.g., Zack, 1985) by national unions and the AFL-CIO superficially contradict
the notion of efficient professional organizers, but note that these calls
emanate from central union authorities and envision the use of rank and file
volunteers in centrally-orchestrated campaigns.
Lazear (1983) provides further justification for centralization of
decision making under the monopoly strategy. In his model the union considers
the impact of its wage decisions on employment in the union sector and the
impact on wages in the nonunion sector. Suppose that individual locals (who
are small compared with the market) all disregard the employment and nonunion
wage implications of increasing wage demands and also ignore the possibility
that increased wages will lead to increased activity by firms to defeat
unions. Here Lazear shows that the wage selected by the locals can be either
too high8 or too low compared with the wage differential that will maximize
the welfare of all union members.
If individual locals realize the possibility for this myopic behavior by
some or all other locals, there will be an incentive to delegate wage-setting
responsibility to nationals. Thus, like the prisoners' dilemma problem, the
local union myopia problem suggests that centralization of decision making is
more probable when individual locals are small compared with their appropriate
market
.
Widespread concession bargaining in the late 1970s and early 1980s
produced many instances in which national unions asserted authority in order
to prevent erosion of standard rates. For example, the 1979 UAW-Chrysler
concessionary settlement undoubtedly contributed to later concessionary
settlements at GM and Ford in 1982 and, subsequently, to the UAW's stress on
returning Chrysler workers to "parity" with GM and Ford workers in the 1985
negotiations (Buss and McNish, 1985). A more recent example involved the UAW
6For example, United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) Local P-9's refusal to
accept the standard concessionary agreement negotiated by the UFCW with Hormel
precipitated the lengthy strike by P-9 at Hormel' s Austin, Minnesota plant in
1985-86 (Bureau of National Affairs, 1986b). Local P-9's efforts to obtain a
rate that exceeded the national standard eventually lead the UFCW to place the
local under trusteeship (Bureau of National Affairs, 1986a).
and Mack Trucks. Mack negotiated concessions with its locals, which were
subsequently vetoed by the UAW's Executive Board. The national UAW then
negotiated its own "tentative" concessionary pact with Mack, which was upheld
in court after it had been approved by the local unions despite efforts by the
national UAW later to void the pact (Bureau of National Affairs, 1987b;
1988). 9 Such local level concessionary bargaining in the auto industry
contributed to a special four-day convention in 1987 "dominated by debate on
'whipsawing' at which delegates considered but did not pass a constitutional
amendment forbidding locally-negotiated exceptions to national contracts"
(Bureau of National Affairs, 1987a: A-4) . The UAW is not the only example.
As Cappelli(1987b) notes, the Machinists (IAM) placed its Braniff local under
trusteeship after it agreed to concessions, and in 1984 the Air Line Pilots'
(ALPA) national organization "reasserted its role as the centralized decision-
making authority of the union through a provision that no contract be binding
unless signed by the national president." ALPA's board of directors
(comprised of local delegates) also accepted resolutions in 1984 that require
"the physical presence, or at least monitoring presence, of the national
organization at contract negotiations," and "formal notification of the
national organization of any negotiations between a pilot group and an
airline." (Ott, 1984: 32)
Efficiency-Strategy Model
Unions also may rely on an efficiency strategy to improve the terras and
conditions of employment for their members. The notion that a union can
improve the efficiency of the firm whose workers it represents, thereby
increasing the firm's profitability and the joint well-being of both firm and
9The national UAW's decision to repudiate its earlier "tentative" agreement
apparently stemmed in part from unfavorable arbitration decisions following
the initial accord.
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workers, is a central element of two recent theoretical models of unions, the
collective voice model (Freeman and Medoff , 1984) and the transaction cost
model (Williamson, 1985). Perlman (1928: 277) notes that "It is not at all
unnatural that a unionism which is intent upon job opportunities should join
with management in a joint campaign to reduce the cost of operation and raise
efficiency - all for the 'conservation' of current job opportunities."
The collective voice model assumes that individual dissatisfied workers
have two alternative means of expressing their dissatisfaction to management.
First, they can "voice" their dissatisfaction to management directly, and hope
that some action will be taken. Second, they can leave the firm. Both of
these avenues of communication have drawbacks. Workers may be reluctant to
voice their complaints to management individually. They might fear
retaliation or they might be skeptical of management's willingness to respond
to the complaints of one person. The flip side is that management may not ace
on individual complaints because it is not clear that they represent the
preferences of anyone but the complainant. Relying on quits to convey worker
dissatisfaction imposes high turnover costs on both labor and management. In
addition, the preferences of workers who quit may be quite different from
those of the average worker. Thus, shaping the terms and conditions of
employment to those who are most likely to quit may lead to an inefficient
package of compensation and employment conditions . Unions , by providing
mechanisms to collect information about the preferences of all workers and
convey that information to the employer, can provide a third alternative --
collective voice.
This model suggests that collective voice can improve efficiency in two
ways. First, collective voice provides management with better information
about the average worker's preferences than either exit behavior or individual
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voicing of complaints. This leads to a package of compensation and employment
conditions that better fits workers' preferences than would occur otherwise.
The efficiency properties of collective voice stem, in part, from the more
efficient contracts that result from the improved communication of the average
worker's preferences. In addition, the improved communication and the more
desirable employment contract that results may enhance worker morale,
encourage cooperation, and reduce quits, which all* can lead to increased
productivity.
As Hirsch and Addison (1986: 191) have observed, there is a good deal of
similarity between the collective voice model of unions and the transaction
cost model as applied to unions by Williamson (1985) . The latter model
assumes that organizations will choose a governance structure that economizes
on transaction costs. Under this model, parties to idiosyncratic exchanges
have an incentive to develop complex governance structures to assure the
longevity of the exchange relationship, because ending such idiosyncratic
exchange relationships imposes high transaction costs. This suggests that the
formal and enforceable governance structures provided by unions through
collective bargaining will be more desirable in employment relationships in
which both workers and the firm have invested in the workers' acquisition of
firm-specific skills (Williamson, 1985). Williamson (1985: 241) emphasizes
that the governance structures that unions negotiate with firms can improve
efficiency along several dimensions including the following: wage and benefit
determination, enhancement of productivity through human asset development,
improved dispute settlement procedures, increased regard for dignity, and more
efficacious adaptation.
The implication of both models is that a union may consciously choose a
bargaining strategy that is designed to result in more efficient operations at
12
the firm with which it bargains and, thus to increase the firm's
profitability. If the employees represented by the union will benefit from
the increased profitability, such a strategy should result in improvements in
the terms and conditions of employment for those members.
An efficiency strategy may be best accomplished under a decentralized
governance structure. Such a strategy will be effective only if the union's
governance structure permits work rules and other terms of employment to be
tailored to local circumstances and needs. As Raskin (1987: 7) notes, "No
cookie cutter can stamp out the ideal plan for employee involvement; each must
be fashioned with infinite care to meet the joint needs of a particular
enterprise and its workers." Thus, strongly emphasizing an efficiency
strategy for improving the terms and conditions of employment, unlike
emphasizing a monopoly strategy, would suggest decentralized control of the
bargaining process and the content of negotiated agreements
.
The Monitoring-Strategy Model
Certain conditions may make it desirable to centralize some aspects of
the bargaining process (as opposed to centralization of control over the
content of negotiated collective bargaining agreements) regardless of whether
a monopoly strategy is feasible or desirable. Effective bargaining may
require a good deal of information about the activities and financial
condition of the firm(s) with which the union bargains, in addition to
information about key environmental circumstances (e.g., labor and produce
market conditions). Unions, therefore, may have a substantial stake in
monitoring the actions of their bargaining partners and the environment in
which they bargain. Although some local bargaining units may be well -equipped
to carry out such monitoring activities, other locals may lack the financial
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and human resources to do so. 10 In such circumstances, the national union may
act as the agent of its affiliated locals in this monitoring process. This,
in turn, may require participation by the national union in various aspects of
the bargaining process to insure efficient delivery of the national union's
information and expertise to local bargaining situations. In other words,
effective monitoring may require involvement of the national union in the
bargaining process , but the motivation for that involvement is to provide
assistance to locals in their bargaining activities rather than to exert
control over them. We would expect, therefore, to observe centralization of
some aspects of the bargaining process in national unions in which the
national union has a comparative advantage, compared with its affiliated
locals, in the acquisition of the information required for effective
bargaining.
II. An Empirical Model of Centralization of Control over Bargaining
The construct that we seek to model is the locus of control over
collective bargaining within national unions. Control can be conceptualized
as varying along a continuum, with complete centralization of control over
collective bargaining at the apex of the hierarchy (i.e., the national level
of the organization) representing one extreme, and with complete local
autonomy (i.e., decentralization) at the other extreme. Our discussion of
bargaining strategies, however, suggests that control over bargaining may
comprise two components: (1) control over the actual content of the negotiated
agreement, and (2) control over the bargaining process. A monopoly strategy
may motivate centralization of control over the former -- allocating control
10Note that the average U.S. local has about 200 members (Mills, 1989: 79) and
that union dues typically amount to one or two hours' pay per member per month
(Mills, 1989: 83). The resources available to the typical local are thus
small
.
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over the content of locally negotiated agreements to the national union eases
enforcement of a standard rate. In contrast, centralization of control over
the bargaining process may be motivated by either a monopoly strategy or a
monitoring strategy (or both) . On one hand, control over the process gives
the national union an indirect means of influencing the content of agreements
negotiated by affiliated locals. For example, requiring locals to include a
representative of the national union on their bargaining teams gives the
national union an avenue through which it might influence the content of the
collective bargaining agreement that they negotiate. On the other hand, a
monitoring strategy may require some centralization of the bargaining process
even without a monopoly strategy. Thus, the national union's motivation for
requiring local bargaining teams to include national representatives may
simply be to provide assistance to the local, in the form of information and
expertise. Conversely, an efficiency strategy may require decentralized
control over both the process and content of collective bargaining.
Measures of Centralization of Control over Bargaining
While the construct of centralization is widely understood, it cannot be
measured directly and has no obvious empirical counterpart. The preceding
discussion suggests that there are two latent (i.e., unobservable) , continuous
dependent variables of interest, each indexed by i = 1 , 2:
T7ij - the degree of centralization over the bargaining process ;
r/2j = the degree of centralization over the content of the negotiated
collective bargaining agreement;
where j = 1 n refers to the national unions in the sample. Although we
cannot observe any of the rjij directly, we can observe rules adopted by
national unions that govern the locus of control over bargaining.
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Following Lahne (1970) , we rely upon the provisions of national union
constitutions as our source for information regarding the allocation of
control over the decisions/activities that comprise the bargaining process.
Such constitutional provisions are the "... vehicles of centralization of
control" (Lahne, 1970: 188), in the sense that they make decisions/actions
taken by a subordinate body- -the affiliated bargaining unit- -subj ect to the
approval of a higher level body in the organizational hierarchy (i.e., an
intermediate level or the national level) . Specifically, we have gathered
information from a sample of 83 national union constitutions on nine observed
dependent variables that represent the degree of centralization of control
exerted over collective bargaining:
BLSCORE = the level(s) at which bargaining takes place;
DSSCORE — the level(s) at which the decision to strike occurs;
DTSCORE = the level(s) at which the decision to end a strike occurs;
FDSCORE = the level(s) at which bargaining demands are formulated;
NPSCORE = the level(s) from which negotiating personnel are drawn;
APPROVE = the level(s) at which local bargaining demands must be approved;
NATAPVL = an indicator variable equal to one if contracts negotiated by
affiliates must be approved by the national union, and equal to
zero otherwise;
NATPROH = an indicator variable equal to one if the national constitution
prohibits certain provisions in contracts negotiated by its
affiliates, and equal to zero otherwise;
NOLOCRAT - an indicator variable equal to one if the national constitution
does not require local ratification of contracts, and equal to
zero otherwise.
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We scored the variables, APPROVE, BLSCORE, DSSCORE, DTSCORE, FDSCORE, and
NPSCORE on a five-point scale, with a score of five representing the highest
degree of centralization. The scores may be interpreted in the following
manner:
1 - local control of activity or no provision specified
2 = local and intermediate control of activity
3 = local and either intermediate or national control of activity
4 = intermediate and national control of activity
5 = national control of activity
BLSCORE, DSSCORE, DTSCORE, FDSCORE, and NPSCORE represent the degree of
centralization over various aspects of the bargaining process; APPROVE,
NATAPVL, NATPROH, and NOLOCRAT measure rules that more directly influence the
allocation of control within the organization over the actual content of the
negotiated collective bargaining agreements.
Empirical Specification
Our model consists of the following system of linear structural
equations
:
(1) T7!j = 7l 'Xj + j-y ,
and
(2) r72j = 72'Xj + £l»7lj + f 2j ,
where rjij and rj 2 j are the latent dependent variables defined above and Xj is a
qxl vector of observed explanatory variables. 0i is a coefficient
representing the direct causal effect of rjij on tj 2j , 71 and y 2 are vectors of
coefficients representing the direct causal effects of the independent
variables in the vector X on the latent dependent variables (171J and rj 2j) , and
5"ij and $*2j are random error terms.
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We do not observe the latent dependent variables. However, we do
observe a vector, yPj (p = 1,...,5), containing the five observed dependent
variables representing the locus of control over the bargaining process,
BLSCORE, DSSCORE, DTSCORE, FDSCORE, and NPSCORE, and a vector, ypj (p =
6,..., 9), containing the four observed dependent variables representing the
locus of control over the content of the collective bargaining agreement,
APPROVE, NATAPVL, NATPROH , and NOLOCRAT. The measurement model for each of
the y-variables is the following:
(3) Ypj = *p»?ij + £ pj'
where i=l if p < 5 and i=2 otherwise, A p is a coefficient representing the
effect of rjij on y Pj , and e Pj is the residual.
In addition, the model assumes that one latent dependent variable, r/ij
(which we label PROCESS) , has a direct causal effect upon the other latent
dependent variable, r)2j (which we label CONTENT). Centralization of control
over the bargaining process may provide an indirect means for a national union
to exert control over the content of agreements negotiated by affiliates.
Since the national union jointly choses r;ij and r?2j , estimation of equation (3)
by OLS would result in simultaneity bias.
We estimate the model using LISREL, a computer program for estimating
the unknown coefficients in a set of linear structural equations . The
advantage of the LISREL program is that it is based on a general model that is
designed to handle models in which there are both latent variables and
observed variables, in which the observed variables may be measured with
error, and in which there is simultaneous causality. LISREL estimation
provides consistent estimates of the unknown parameters in such models and
tools for assessing the model's fit (Joreskog and Sdrbom, 1984: 1.26, 1.36).
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We present a path diagram in Figure 1. The variables in the left-hand
column of the path diagram are the observed (independent) X- variables in the
model. These observed independent variables are defined in Table 1. We
hypothesize the links between each of these observed independent variables and
the latent dependent variables in the next subsection.
INSERT FIGURE 1 & TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Hypotheses
Our preceding discussion of the implications of a union's bargaining
strategy for centralization of control over collective bargaining suggests
that different strategies have different implications for the optimal locus of
control over collective bargaining within the hierarchy of the national union.
Reliance on the monopoly strategy may require centralization of authority over
both the collective bargaining process and the content of the resulting
negotiated agreement. In contrast, centralization may undermine an efficiency
strategy. Finally, centralization of control over the bargaining process, but
not the content of the negotiated agreement, will be compatible with a
monitoring strategy under circumstances in which the national union has a
comparative advantage over affiliated locals in carrying out monitoring
activities related to bargaining. Since unions may pursue multiple strategies
simultaneously, we specify the model to allow paths from the independent
variables associated with all three strategies to both the CONTENT and PROCESS
latent variables. To the extent that some independent variables only measure
monitoring effects, we might expect them to have no influence on the CONTENT
construct. Specific hypotheses based upon our analysis of each strategy's
implications are summarized below.
Hypotheses Related to the Monopoly Strategy . Effective implementation
of a monopoly strategy may require centralization of control over the content
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of the collective bargaining agreement, which may be accomplished directly by
locating control over formulation of demands and approval of the contract at
the national level of the organization or indirectly through centralization of
control over the bargaining process. The ability to carry out this strategy
depends on the product market conditions in the industries in which the
union's members work. If these industries are highly competitive, the union
must be able to organize the entire market (take wages "out of competition")
and to centralize decision making to avoid whipsawing within the organized
markets. However, if the degree of unionization is low, a strategy of
centralized decision making is likely to lead to less flexibility in dealing
with local problems than is necessary for competitive firms to survive. Thus
we expect that unions in unconcentrated industries (UNCONC) , unions that are
located in industries with a high degree of unionization (UDENSITY) , and
unions who represent a substantial share of the unionized workers in their
jurisdiction (PERCENT) to have more centralized decision making.
Centralization is desirable, other things equal, under circumstances in
which it otherwise would be easy for employers to whipsaw the union. The
geographical extent of the market may play a role here. If the product market
is national in scope and plants are located in a variety of labor markets,
employer opportunity to whipsaw will be maximized. Here unions should respond
by centralizing decision making. Thus, we predict a positive relationship
with NATLMKT, which is high when the product market is national and the labor
market is diffuse. If firm size is also a proxy for whipsawing ability, chen
we also would expect a positive relationship with centralization. However,
small firm size also may be a proxy for lack of market power. Here a more
flexible approach may be required and a negative relationship may exist.
Thus, the impact of FIRMSIZE may be ambiguous.
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Finally, national unions whose membership is distributed across a wide
range of industries (measured by HERF) may find it difficult to enforce a
standard rate policy over highly diverse local situations, and thus, should
prefer decentralized control.
Hypotheses Related to a Monitoring Strategy . We expect to observe
greater centralization of the bargaining process, but not the content of the
negotiated agreement, in national unions that have significant advantages over
local unions in the ability to monitor aspects of the bargaining partners'
behavior and environmental conditions relevant to bargaining. The need for
national involvement in bargaining to help effective monitoring should
decrease with the average size of the local union (LOCSIZE) , ceteris paribus.-
Controlling for the size of local affiliates, the monitoring motivation for
centralization of the bargaining process should increase with the size of the
firms with which local affiliates bargain (FIRMSIZE) . There are several
reasons for this. First, Faith and Reid (1983) argue that worker trust in the
actions of the firm declines with the size of the firm. This suggests that
unions whose affiliates bargain with large firms may place a greater emphasis
on the monitoring strategy. In addition, it may be more difficult to acquire
information about employer activities in large firms. For example, the firm
might begin systematically to reduce employment at each unionized plant and
move operations to new nonunion sites. Individual locals would be unlikely to
perceive such a systematic change. However, an attentive national
organization could detect such patterns and potentially coordinate a more
effective response than the locals could independently. Thus, to monitor
effectively the actions of the firm that have implications for bargaining, the
governance structure of bargaining should mimic the structure of the firm. We
would therefore anticipate more centralization of union bargaining activities
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in national unions whose local affiliates must deal with large, multi-
divisional firms. Schacht (1985), for example, argues that the internal
structure of the Communication Workers of America was a direct response to the
centralization of authority within AT&T, its primary bargaining partner. The
divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies from AT&T in 1984 stimulated
significant changes in the structure of the union and in the degree of
centralization of bargaining in the industry (Hendricks, 1987).
Locals affiliated with national unions representing craft workers
(CRAFT) may have little need for national monitoring both because the locals
have adequate financial resources (due to the high earnings of their members)
and because the relevant labor and product market conditions are local in
scope. National unions that represent a substantial share of an industry's
workers (measured by PERCENT) are likely to have significant advantages over
locals in gathering information about the behavior of firms in the industry
and industry conditions in general, which should motivate centralization of
the bargaining process. In contrast, national unions with membership spread
across many industries (HERF) lack such information advantages and so should
have little incentive to centralize control over the bargaining process.
Hypotheses Related Co che Efficiency Strategy . Our previous discussion
suggests that centralization of control over collective bargaining is
incompatible with a strong emphasis on an efficiency strategy. Reliance on an
efficiency strategy requires a union governance structure that permits the
negotiation of a contract that it carefully tailors to local needs. Local
bargaining pairs facing unique environmental conditions may be more likely to
rely on an efficiency strategy over a monopoly strategy to improve the terms
and conditions of their members. This suggests that national unions will be
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less likely to centralize control over collective bargaining when their local
affiliates bargain under highly diverse conditions (HERF)
.
Workers also may vary in their preferences for an efficiency strategy.
For example, workers who identify strongly with management may be more likely
to prefer an efficiency strategy than those who do not. Unfortunately, we
lack the data to examine links between worker characteristics that may
influence preferences for an efficiency strategy and the degree of
centralization of control over bargaining in national unions.
In summary, conditions that encourage reliance on a monopoly strategy
should increase the degree of centralization of control over both the
bargaining process and the content of the negotiated agreement. Thus,
UDENSITY, UNCONC, PERCENT, and NATLMKT should have positive impacts and HERF a
negative impact on both PROCESS and CONTENT. Conditions that encourage
reliance on a monitoring strategy should increase centralization of the
bargaining process, but not centralization of control over the content of the
negotiated agreement. Thus, LOCSIZE, HERF, and CRAFT should have negative
impacts and FIRMSIZE and PERCENT should have positive impacts on PROCESS, but
no impact on CONTENT. Finally, we have included a variable measuring whether
the union primarily bargains under the Railway Labor Act. Since the Act
requires specific structures for bargaining and since the industries covered
by the Act have been historically regulated, it may influence the degree of
centralization of the union. We do not predict a sign for its coefficient a
priori .
Measures of Explanatory Variables
Except for LOCSIZE, each of the X-variables is designed to measure some
characteristic of the national union's product market jurisdiction chat we
hypothesized to influence the locus of control over collective bargaining
23
within the organization. Each union's jurisdiction must be identified to
measure such characteristics. In other words, one must answer this question:
In what industry or industries are the national union's members concentrated?
Thus, information on the distribution of each union's membership across
industries is crucial to addressing this question and defining these
variables. Unfortunately, other than some very crude data reported in the
Directory of National Unions
.
11 no data exist that break down the membership
of national unions by industry. In the Appendix, we describe: 1) the data
base that we have constructed to be able to observe the distribution of each
national union's membership across industries; and 2) our decision rules for
assigning industry characteristics representing the industry-based exogenous
variables in our model to each national union in our sample. In brief, we
developed information on the industry distribution of national unions' members
from two large (numbering in the thousands) samples of union contracts. Based
on this information, we then assigned industry characteristics to national
unions using two alternative assignment criteria. The first criterion assumes
that the characteristics of the industry in which the largest concentration of
the union's members are found strongly influence national union governance
structures - a "primary jurisdiction criterion." The second assumes that
unions adopt governance structures to serve the goals of the "average" member.
Hence industry characteristics for a union are "synthesized" by compiling a
weighted average of each industry level explanatory variable based on the
relative frequency distribution of members across industries.
nThere are several problems with the information reported in the Directory of
National Unions
. First, the data are reported at the 1- or 2-digit SIC
levels, which is too aggregated for our purposes. Second, information is not
reported for all the unions in our sample. Finally, too little information is
provided on the derivation of the information to assess its accuracy.
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We therefore estimate our empirical results using two data bases. In
the first, which we will refer to as the "primary jurisdiction data set"
(denoted PJDS) , we assign the variables CRAFT, FIRMSIZE, NATLMKT , PERCENT,
UNCONC, and UDENSITY based on the national union's primary jurisdiction. In
the second, which we will call the "weighted data set" (denoted as WDS) , we
define the aforementioned six explanatory variables as weighted averages over
all the industries comprising the national union's jurisdiction. We also used
the data on the relative frequency distributions of each national union's
membership across industries to calculate the Herfindal index of the degree of
dispersion of a union's membership across industries (HERF) . The variable,
RWLACT , is defined based on the national union's primary jurisdiction in our
samples. Our results from the estimation of both models using both the
primary jurisdiction sample and the weighted jurisdiction sample are reported
in the following section.
III. Results
We discuss below our results for each of the observed explanatory
variables in the model. Although we note significance levels, we caution the
reader that most of the variables in the primary jurisdiction sample are not
measured continuously, and thus, that we should not rely on the standard
errors estimated for that sample using the LISREL program. This is because
LISREL estimation of standard errors is sensitive to departures from the
assumption that the observed variables are normally distributed (Joreskog and
Sorbom, 1986: IV. 1). We can be more confident about using LISREL estimates of
the standard errors to do hypothesis tests when using the weighted sample,
because departure from the normality assumption is less problematic in that
sample
.
INSERT TABLES 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE
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We provide the factor weights for our measurement model (Ay
coefficients) and the coefficients for our structural equations (the 7
coefficients) in Table 2 for the WDS and Table 3 for the PJDS. Except for
DTSCORE, all the factor weights are greater than twice their standard errors
for both samples. The correlation between PROCESS and CONTENT is positive and
the P coefficient is significantly different from zero in the WDS. The weight
on NOLOCRAT is negative for the CONTENT latent variable. This runs counter to
our interpretation of both latent variables as positive measures of the degree
of centralization. Since our predictions of the results in our structural
equations are conditioned on this interpretation, some ambiguity may be
present concerning the CONTENT equation. However, each of the other measures
has a large positive weight. While our discussion below proceeds on the
assumption that CONTENT is positively associated with centralization, we might
expect less definitive results than for the PROCESS equation.
The monopoly- strategy model suggests that UNCONC , NATLMKT , UDENSITY,
PERCENT should all be positively associated with both PROCESS and CONTENT.
The coefficients for UNCONC and NATLMKT are not measured precisely but are
positive for both latent variables in the PJDS and positive for CONTENT in the
WDS. The coefficients associated with UDENSITY are always positive and are
more than twice the magnitude of their standard errors for CONTENT in both
samples and for PROCESS in the PJDS. The coefficients associated with PERCENT
are positive and more than twice the size of their standard errors in the
PROCESS specifications. In the CONTENT models, the PERCENT coefficient is
positive when we estimate the model using the PJDS, but negative in the model
estimated using the WDS. In both CONTENT models, we estimate the coefficient
on PERCENT imprecisely.
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The monitoring- strategy model predicts negative coefficients for CRAFT
and the size of the national union's local affiliates (LOCSIZE) in the PROCESS
equation. These predictions are confirmed in both data sets and the
coefficients are significantly different from zero in the WDS . This model
also predicts positive coefficients for FIRMSIZE and the percentage of
unionized workers organized by this union (PERCENT) for the PROCESS equation.
Both variables have positive coefficients and the PERCENT coefficients are
significantly different from zero in both data sets.
All three of our strategy models suggest that centralization will be
inversely related to the degree of heterogeneity among local affiliates of the
national union (HERF) . This result accrues in the CONTENT equations but not
in the PROCESS equation where we would expect a strong negative effect. The
coefficient is positive and approaches conventional significance levels in the
WDS PROCESS equation.
While we've made no predictions for the coefficients for RWLACT , these
coefficients are consistently positive for both data sets. Thus, either
characteristics of the Railway Labor Act, such as the requirement of system-
wide bargaining by occupational classification, or regulation in airlines and
railroads may lead to more centralized structures in these unions
.
Several alternative methods exist for evaluating the overall fit of the
model. The x2 test is perhaps most often cited although small discrepancies
between the model and the data can lead to rejection in large samples. This
test is also very sensitive to departures from multinormality assumptions. In
our case, we do not reject the model (x2 =92.1 with 89 degrees of freedom, p
=
.29) for the WDS, but we do reject (x2 = 115.4, p = .03) for the PJDS. As
noted above, this is probably a reflection of the measurement of our
independent variables rather than a true indication of the choice process.
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Tanaka and La Due(1989) suggest that the Joreskog and Sorbom goodness of fit
index is much more robust to deviations from normality. Values of the index
near one indicate that a relatively large amount of the variances and
covariances are jointly explained by the model (Joreskog and Sorbom,
1984:1.40-1.41). Estimates of this index for the two data sets are of similar
magnitude (.89 for WDS and .87 for PJDS)
.
A drawback of the LISREL estimation procedure is that the model assumes
that the observed variables in the system "are quantitative variables in the
sense that they represent measurements which are, at least approximately, on
an interval scale" (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1984:IV.l). When this assumption is
violated, one should not rely on standard errors and goodness of fit tests.
This suggests that when some of the observed variables are measured
discretely, as happens in our data, one should be cautious about using the
LISREL results to conduct hypothesis tests. For this reason, we have also
estimated an OLS version of our model.
In the OLS version we model the latent dependent variables, r7ij , as a
simple linear function of a set of exogenous explanatory variables:
(4) f7id = 7'*j +/i, i = 1, 2; j = l,...,n;
where Xj is a Kxl vector of explanatory variables hypothesized to determine
the degree of centralization over bargaining; 7 is a Kxl vector of
coefficients to be estimated, and /ij is a random error term, which we assume
is distributed N(0,1).
To estimate this model, we proxy the two latent dependent variables,
r7ij, by two indices, PROCESSIj and CONTENTIj, which we've based on the nine
observed variables measuring the national union's constitutional provisions
governing collective bargaining described above. We computed PROCESSIj by
dividing each of the variables, BLSCORE, DSSCORE, DTSCORE, FDSCORE, and
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NPSCORE by their standard deviations, and summing the resulting standardized
variables. CONTENTI-; is constructed in an analogous manner using the
variables, APPROVE, NATAPVL, NATPROH, and NOLOCRAT . We estimate the models in
which PROCESSIj , and CONTENTIj are the dependent variables using ordinary
least squares regression procedures.
The reader will note that this specification, unlike the LISREL
specification, does not hypothesize any causal links between the endogenous
variables. If centralization of control over the bargaining process gives the
national union an indirect means of exerting control over the content of
agreements negotiated by local affiliates, then we can treat Equation 4 as a
reduced form equation.
The results of our OLS re-specification are given in Table 4. Except
for the UNCONC coefficients estimated from the WDS , which we measure very
imprecisely, all the coefficients have the hypothesized signs and support the
hypotheses generated by our theoretical model.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Collective bargaining is the primary method by which U.S. unions can
achieve their goal of improving the terms and conditions of employment for
their members. In this paper we have delineated three bargaining strategies
that unions can use to enhance their bargaining success - a monopoly
strategy, a monitoring/information strategy, and an efficiency strategy - and
have analyzed the implications of each strategy for the optimal degree of
centralization of control over collective bargaining within the hierarchy of
national unions.
Our empirical analysis supports the notion chat there are two components
to centralization of control over collective bargaining activities, control
over the bargaining process and control over the content of negotiated
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agreements. Our results are also consistent with the view that centralization
of control over the bargaining process may serve as a mechanism for achieving
centralization of control over the content of negotiated agreements. The
estimated relationships between industry and union characteristics and the
PROCESS and CONTENT constructs are consistent with the monitoring/information
strategy for improving bargaining success and provide mild support for the
monopoly strategy. This occurs because we are much more successful in
explaining variation in the PROCESS latent variable than in the CONTENT
measure of centralization. However, since our measurement model gives some
ambiguous results concerning the CONTENT construct, we are reluctant to draw
any firm conclusions that monitoring strategy considerations dominate union
organizational design.
A comparison of the forces that lead to the centralization of control in
national unions with the forces that lead to centralization in firms suggests
that unions are more similar to employer or industry associations than they
are to firms. Specifically, while a firm's choice of governance structure may
have implications for its ability to monitor the environment, it is unlikely
to influence the firm's market power. In contrast, union decisions about
organizational design, like those of business associations, have a direct
bearing on market power and information. The informational and monopoly
problems faced by an organization are often closely intertwined, and thus
monitoring and monopoly strategies will often be complementary for both unions
and other types of associations. There are further parallels to political and
economic theories of the formation of interest groups (Peitzman, 1989 and
Becker, 1983) since the forces that lead to the formation of these groups are
similar to the determinants of centralization for unions. Thus, we view our
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work as a further contribution in the area of voluntary organizations in
addition to the more narrow area of collective bargaining.
These results provide a snapshot view of the centralization of U.S.
unions in the latter 1970' s. A similar study done for another time period
might yield considerably different results. In addition, we need to combine
these results with studies of the evolution (Hannan and Freeman, 1987) and
mortality of unions (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) to understand the structure of
dominance and control within the labor movement.
Our analysis and results suggest several issues in need of further
investigation. In this paper, we have focused on the following question:
What motivates national unions to choose a given degree of centralization of
control over collective bargaining? Further research is needed on the broader
issue of what motivates national unions to choose particular types of internal
governance structures, and perhaps even more important: What are the
implications of a union's choice of governance structure for organizational
success? Our monopoly strategy/model of centralization of control over
bargaining, for example, suggests that higher centralization may result in a
lower dispersion of wages and labor costs in the union's jurisdiction. Our
monitoring/information model, on the other hand, suggests that in certain
circumstances centralization of control over the bargaining process may give
negotiators access to better and more complete information, which in turn may
influence both bargaining power and strike activity. 12 A more thorough
investigation of these issues would provide useful information to both labor
12 If, as many economic models of strike activity assume, imperfect information
causes strikes, governance structures that improve the quantity and quality of
information available to union negotiators should diminish the incidence of
strikes
.
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leaders and policy-makers, and enhance our general understanding of the
determinants of organizational effectiveness.
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TABLE 1
DEFINITIONS OF X VARIABLES'
UNCONC* A dummy variable taking on a value of 1 for primary industries
that have the value of shipments of the eight largest firms less
than 33%.
UDENSITY* The percentage of workers in the primary jurisdiction Industry
covered by collective bargaining.
NATLMKT* A dummy variable taking on a value of 1 for primary industries
that have national product markets and do not have supply
concentrated in one geographic area.
FIRMSIZE* The average size of firms in the primary jurisdiction industry.
PERCENT* The percentage of unionized workers in the primary jurisdiction
industry who are organized by this union.
CRAFT* The percentage of workers in the primary jurisdiction industry who
are members of skilled trades.
HERF
LOCSIZE
RU1ACT
A Herfindal index of the degree of concentration of union members
by 4-digit SIC code defined as:
i
- Zi Pi
2
where pi is the proportion of workers in the i th SIC industry.
HERF is zero for perfect concentration.
The natural log of average local size for the union.
A dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if the primary
jurisdiction of the union is in the railroad or airline industry.
For the WDS these variables are defined by multiplying their values for each
industry by the ratio of the number of this union's members in the industry to
the total number of members in this union.
Data sources are available from the third author on request.
Figure 1. •
A Model of Centralization of Control
over Collective Bargaining in National Unions
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CRAFT
FIRMSIZE
LOCSIZE
NATLMKT
PERCENT
HERF
RV7LACT
UNCONC
UDENSITY
BLSCORE
DSSCORE
DTSCORE
FDSCORE
NPSCORE
APPROVE
NATAPVL
NATPROH
NOLOCRAT
3S
TABLE 2
Maximum Likelihood Estimates from LISREL
Weighted Data (N=75)
Unstandardized Standardized
ETAs PROCESS CONTENT PROCESS CONTENT
LAMBDA Y COEFFICIENTS
BLSCORE
DSSCORE
DTSCORE
FDSCORE
NPSCORE
APPROVE
NOLOCRAT
NATAPVL
NATPROH
l.OOO(.OOO)
0.236(.193)
0.827(.216)
0.647(.205)
0.576(.202)
l.OOO(.OOO)
-0.360(.157)
0.752(.163)
0.733(.162)
0.706
0.167
0.584
0.457
0.406
0.827
-0.297
0.621
0.605
GAMMA COEFFICIENTS
UNCONC -0.045( .107) 0.103( .121)
UDENSITY 0.107( .124) 0.286( .134)
LOCSIZE -0.196( .096) 0.054( .107)
NATLMKT -0.079( .102) 0.065( .116)
HERF 0.231( .117) -0.320( .121)
RWLACT 0.139( .112) 0.114( .125)
PERCENT 0.265( .098) -0.151(..105)
CRAFT -0.171( .102) 0.178(..111)
FIRMSIZE 0.196( .126) -0.205( .138)
0.064 0.124
0.152 0.346
0.278 0.065
0.112 0.078
0.327 -0.387
0.197 0.138
0.375 -0.183
0.243 0.216
0.277 -0.248
Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. The coefficients for BLSCORE and
APPROVE were fixed at 1.000 in the unsealed solution. The Standardized
solution fixes the variances of PROCESS and CONTENT at 1.000. The Beta
coefficient for the path from PROCESS to CONTENT was estimated as 0.394(.160)
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TABLE 3
Maximum Likelihood Estimates from LISREL
Primary Jurisdiction Data (N=78)
Unstandardized Standardized
ETAs PROCESS CONTENT PROCESS CONTENT
LAMBDA Y COEFFICIENTS
BLSCORE 1.000( .000)
DSSCORE 0.353( .181)
DTSCORE 0.785( .195)
FDSCORE 0.591(,.186)
NPSCORE 0.639( .188)
APPROVE 1.000( .000)
NOLOCRAT -0.427( .185)
NATAPVL 0.848( .212)
NATPROH 0.726( .199)
0.737
0.260
0.578
0.436
0.471
0. 744
-0. 318
0. 631
0. 540
GAMMA COEFFICIENTS
UNCONC 0.080( .112) 0.115( .121)
UDENSITY 0.263( .123) 0.288( .125)
LOCSIZE -0.119( .095) 0.028( .103)
NATLMKT 0.008( .095) 0.087( .103)
HERF 0.086( .104) -0.229( .109)
RWLACT 0.182( .133) 0.094( .143)
PERCENT 0.253( .098) 0.053( .104)
CRAFT -0.143( .102) 0.034( .110)
FIRMSIZE 0.069( .124) -0.079( .134)
0.108 0.154
0.358 0.387
0.162 0.037
0.011 0.116
0.117 -0.307
0.247 0.127
0.343 0.072
0.194 0.046
0.093 -0.106
Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. The coefficients for BLSCORE
APPROVE were fixed at 1.000 in the unsealed solution. The Standardized
solution fixes the variances of PROCESS and CONTENT at 1.000. The 3eta
coefficient from PROCESS to CONTENT was estimated as 0.199 (.166).
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APPENDIX
Distributions of Each Union's Membership Across Industries . We
constructed a membership distribution across industries for each national
union by aggregating up from micro -level data on the number of employees
covered under collective bargaining contracts negotiated by affiliates of the
union. Ideally, one would use the universe of contracts negotiated by
affiliates of each of the national unions in our sample to construct such
distributions. Unfortunately, it is impossible to identify all contracts in
that universe. We have combined data from two collective bargaining contract
samples to construct the most comprehensive contract data base possible.
Our first sample comprises those contracts on file at the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (ELS) in 1975. The BLS gathered collective bargaining
agreements for all bargaining units covering at least 1000 workers in all
private sector industries except railroads and airlines. Their 1975 sample
included approximately 1500 of these contracts. The BLS also collected other
contracts covering workers in smaller bargaining units, although their
sampling of smaller units was less comprehensive than that of the larger
units. The total number of contracts on file at the BLS in 1975 was 5,979.
The information available about each contract included the number of workers
covered by the contract, the national union with which the contracting local
union was affiliated, the name(s) and locations of the contracting
employer(s)
, and the contracting employer(s) ' Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) industry code. Usually, SIC codes were reported at the
4-digit level.
We constructed our second contract sample using information gathered
from the Bureau of National Affairs' (BNA) biweekly surveys, Collective
11
Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts , for the period 1976 to 1981. 1 The BNA
sample, which included 7,681 contracts of various sizes, contained identifying
information similar to that provided for contracts in the BLS sample. Because
the BNA data base spanned a period of several years, it included multiple
contracts for some bargaining units. For identifying employee coverage for
each national union, these represent duplicate observations. After
elimination of 3,328 such duplicates, the resulting BNA sample consisted of
4,353 contracts negotiated by unique units.
We matched the BNA and BLS samples by hand using information on the
employer's name, the union, and the location of each of the units. The
matching process identified 1,828 duplicate observations. When we omitted
duplicates, the resulting combined sample included 8,504 distinct private
sector bargaining units. Although the sample does not include all private
sector workers covered by collective bargaining in the U.S., we are confident
that a large percentage of all such workers are represented because there is a
bias in both samples toward inclusion of all large units.
Assignment: of Industry Characteristics to Unions. The extent to which a
national union's affiliated employees concentrate in a single industry varies
considerably across unions. While some unions have a narrowly defined
jurisdiction, others represent workers employed across a wide spectrum of
industries. Even among those unions with multiple industry jurisdictions,
there is variation in the degree of similarity among the industries comprising
xWe are grateful to John Abowd for providing us with these data. The BNA data
do not include contracts in construction industries, but do cover railroads
and airlines, and therefore fill some gaps in the BLS data. The assignment of
SIC codes and the reporting of the number of workers covered by bargaining
units in the BNA sample was sometimes less than satisfactory. For this
reason, we used the information reported by the BLS for observations that were
duplicated in both samples. For observations that appeared only in the BNA
sample and for which the number of workers covered was not reported, we used
estimates made by Abowd (1989).
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the union's jurisdiction. For example, workers represented by the Oil,
Chemical, and Atomic Workers' Union (OCAW) concentrate in a few industries
that are similar in many respects. In contrast, the Teamsters (IBT) represent
workers in just about every industry imaginable. 2 This type of variation
among national unions in the scope of their jurisdictions and in the diversity
of the industries comprising a union's jurisdiction raises a question about
the manner in which industry characteristics influence choice of governance
structure. In other words, do unions choose the governance structure that
best facilitates accomplishing the goals of its largest constituent group
(i.e., those affiliated employees who work in the industry with the largest
concentration of the union's members) or that which best facilitates
accomplishing the goals of the "average" affiliated employee? This, in turn,
raises this question: Should explanatory variables measuring industry
characteristics be defined based on the national union's primary jurisdiction
or as the average over all the industries comprised in the national union's
jurisdiction? The data described in the previous section permitted us to
experiment with both methods of defining variables measuring industry
characteristics to each union.
Our first method involved identifying a primary industry jurisdiction
for each union and then assigning to that union the values that the industry
level explanatory variables take on for that primary jurisdiction. This
method assumes that the union will choose a structure that most efficiently
accomplishs the goals of the workers in the industry with the greatest
concentration of its constituents (even though the union may represent workers
in several industries, who therefore may have conflicting interests regarding
the optimal choice of governance structure)
.
2This type of union is commonly called a general jurisdiccion union.
IV
To identify a primary industry jurisdiction for each union, we used the
data from the combined BLS and BNA contract sample to construct a relative
frequency distribution of employees covered by each union's collective
bargaining contracts across industries. Based upon that distribution, we
identified the SIC industry in which the highest concentration (i.e., the
highest percentage) of employees covered by each union's contracts were
employed. That industry was designated as the primary jurisdiction for that
union. For example, SIC 3011, the Tires and Inner Tubes Manufacturing
industry, was designated as the primary jurisdiction industry for the Rubber
Workers (URW) because an estimated 72% of the employees covered by contracts
negotiated by affiliates of the URW are employed in that industry. We report
our primary jurisdiction assignments for each of the 83 national unions in our
sample in the appendix table.
INSERT APPENDIX TABLE ABOUT HERE.
Our second method assumes that each national union will choose a
governance structure that best facilitates accomplishing the goals of the
"average" affiliated employee. We use Che relative frequency distribution of
employees covered by each union's collective bargaining contracts across
industries to compute a weighted average of each industry level explanatory
variable for each union, using the percent of the union's affiliated employees
who work in the industry as weights.
VPrimary Jurisdiction Assignments for International Unions
UNION NAME S
Airline Pilots (ALPA)
Allied Industrial Workers
(AIW)
Aluminum Workers (ABGW)
Asbestos Workers (HFI)
Auto Workers (UAW)
Bakery Workers (BCTW)
Boilermakers (BBF)
Boot & Shoe Workers (BSW)
Brick & Clay Workers (UBCW)
Bricklayers (BAC)
Broadcast Employees (NABET)
Carpenters (CJA)
Cement Workers (CLGW)
Chemical Workers (ICW)
Clothing Workers (ACTWU)
Communication Workers (CWA)
Coopers (CIU)
Distillery Workers (DWW)
Distributive Workers (DWA)
Electrical Workers (IBEW)
Electrical Workers (IUE)
Electrical Workers (UE)
Elevator Contractors (IUEC)
Firemen & Oilers (IBFO)
Flint Glass Workers (AFGW)
Furniture Workers (UFW)
Garment Workers (UG)
Glass Bottle Blowers (GPPAW)
Glass & Ceramic Workers
Graphic Arts Union (GCIU)
Grain Millers (AFG)
Hatters (HCMW)
Hotel & Restaurant
Employees (HER)
Insurance Workers (IWIU)
Jewelry Workers (JWU)
Laborers (LIUNA)
Ladies Garment Workers (ILGWU
Laundry & Dry Cleaning
Workers (LDC)
Leather, Plastic & Novelty
Workers (LGPN)
Leather Workers (LWU)
Longshore Association (IL)
Longshore & Warehouse
Workers (ILWU)
Machinists (IAM)
Maintenance of Way
Employees (BMWE)
INDUSTRY NAME
TRANSPORTATION BY AIR
MOTOR VEHICLE PARTS & ACCESSORIES
ALUMINUM SHEET, PLATE & FOIL
INSTALLING BUILDING EQUIPMENT, NEC.
MOTOR VEHICLES
BREAD CAKE & RELATED PRODUCTS
HEAVY CONSTRUCTION, NEC.
SHOES, EXCEPT RUBBER
BRICK & STRUCTURAL CLAY TILE
MASONRY, STONEWORK & PLASTERING
RADIO & TELEVISION BROADCASTING
GENERAL BUILDING CONTRACTORS
CEMENT, HYDRAULIC
CHEMICALS & ALLIED PRODUCTS
MEN'S & BOYS' SUITS & COATS
TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION
COOPERAGE
DISTILLED LIQUOR, EXCEPT BRANDY
APPAREL
TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION
ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIAL APPARATUS, NEC
ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIAL APPARATUS, NEC
INSTALLING BUILDING EQUIPMENT, NEC.
RAILROADS, LINEHAUL OPERATING
PRESSED & BLOWN GLASS, NEC.
HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE
MEN'S & BOYS' SHIRTS & NIGHTWEAR
PRODUCTS OF PURCHASED GLASS
FLAT GLASS
COMMERCIAL PRINTING
FLOUR & OTHER GRAIN PRODUCTS
HATS & CAPS, EXCEPT MILLINERY
EATING & DRINKING PLACES
STOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
JEWELRY, PRECIOUS METAL
GENERAL BUILDING CONTRACTORS
WOMEN'S & MISSES' DRESSES
7210 LAUNDRY, CLEANING & GARMENT SERVICES
IC COD
4500
3714
3353
1796
3711
2051
1621
3141
3251
1740
4830
1511
3241
2800
2311
4811
2445
2085
2300
4811
3629
3629
1796
4011
3229
2510
2321
3231
3211
2750
2041
2352
5810
6312
3911
1511
)2335
3171
3111
4463
4463
3721
4011
WOMEN'S HANDBAGS & PURSES
LEATHER TANNING & FINISHING
MARINE CARGO HANDLING
MARINE CARGO HANDLING
AIRCRAFT
RAILROADS, LINEHAUL OPERATING
VI
Marble, Slate, & Stone
Polishers (TMT) 1740
Marine Engineers (MEB) 4411
Marine & Shipbuilding
Workers (IUMS) 3731
Masters, Mates & Pilots (MMP) 4411
Meat Cutters (MCBW) 5411
Metal Polishers (MPBP) 3599
Mine Workers (UM) 1211
Molders (IMAW) 3321
Musicians (AFM) 7920
Newspaper Guild (TNG) 2711
Office & Professional
Employees (OPEIU) 6312
Oil, Atomic & Chemical
Workers (OCAW) 2911
Painters (PAT) 1721
Paper Workers (UPIU) 2600
Plant Guards (PG) 3710
Plumbers (PPF) 1711
Potters (IBPAW) 3263
Printing & Graphics (PGCU) 2751
Professional 6c Technical
Engineers (PT) 3600
Railroad Signalmen (BRS) 4011
Railway Carmen (BRC) 4011
Railway Clerks (BRA) 4011
Retail Clerks (UFC) 5411
Roofers (RWA) 1761
Rubber Workers (URW) 3011
Seafarers (SIUNA) 4411
Services Workers (SEIU) 8060
Sheet Metal Workers (SMW) 1711
Shoe Workers (USW) 3143
Stage Workers (IATS) 7810
Steel Workers (USA) 3312
Stove Workers (SFAAW) 3433
Teamsters (IBT) 4210
Telegraphers (UT) 4821
Textile Workers (UTWA) 2211
Tobacco Workers (TWIU) 2111
Toy Workers (NPW) 3942
Train Dispatchers (TD) 4011
Transit Workers (ATU) 4100
Typographical Union (ITU) 2711
Upholsterers (UIU) 2512
Utility Workers (UW) 4930
Western Pulp & Paper
Workers (WPP) 2611
Woodworkers (IWA) 2421
MASONRY, STONEWORK & PLASTERING
DEEP SEA FOREIGN TRANSPORTATION
SHIP BUILDING & REPAIRING
DEEP SEA FOREIGN TRANSPORTATION
GROCERY STORES
MISC. MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL
BITUMINOUS COAL MINING
GRAY IRON FOUNDRIES
PRODUCERS, ORCHESTRAS & ENTERTAINERS
NEWSPAPERS
STOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
PETROLEUM REFINING
PAINTING, PAPER HANGING & DEC'ING
PAPER & ALLIED PRODUCTS
MOTOR VEHICLES & EQUIPMENT
PLUMBING, HEATING & AIR-CONDITIONING
FINE EARTHENWARE FOOD UTENSILS
COMMERCIAL PRINTING, EXC . LITHO
.
ELECTRIC & ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
RAILROADS, LINE-HAUL OPERATING
RAILROADS, LINEHAUL OPERATING
RAILROADS, LINE-HAUL OPERATING
GROCERY STORES
ROOFING & SHEET METAL WORK
TIRES & INNER TUBES
DEEP SEA FOREIGN TRANSPORTATION
HOSPITALS
PLUMBING, HEATING 6, AIR CONDITIONING
MEN'S FOOTWEAR, EXCEPT ATHLETIC
MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION & SERVICES
BLAST FURNACES & STEEL MILLS
HEATING EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL
TRUCKING, LOCAL & LONG DISTANCE
TELEGRAPH COMMUNICATION
WEAVING MILLS, COTTON
CIGARETTES
DOLLS
RAILROADS, LINE-HAUL OPERATING
LOCAL & INTERURBAN TRANSIT
NEWSPAPERS
UPHOLSTERED HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE
COMBINATION UTILITY SERVICES
PULP MILLS
SAWMILLS & PLANING MILLS, GENERAL


